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I. INTRODUCTION
April 17, 1990, is a day that has, or should have, tremendous sig-
nificance for anyone with even a passing interest in religious liberty.
On that day the Supreme Court handed down its infamous decision,
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith,1
which unexpectedly and dramatically altered the degree of protection
available to religious observers under the Free Exercise Clause.2
Prior to Smith, the general consensus in the legal community was that
even laws unintentionally burdening a claimant's right to free exer-
cise of religion had to serve a compelling governmental interest 3 to
pass constitutional muster.4 Smith reversed this paradigm by charac-
1. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. I (providing that "Congress shall make no law ... prohibiting
the free exercise [of religion]").
3. This is the language of "strict scrutiny" review. For the specific implications of
this level of judicial scrutiny, see infra note 20.
4. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 893-94 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (arguing that it was a
well settled principle of free exercise jurisprudence that the government is re-
quired "to justify any substantial burden on religiously motivated conduct by a
compelling state interest and by means narrowly tailored to achieve that inter-
est"); Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision,
57 U. CH. L. REV. 1109, 1109-10 (1990) (noting that in the decades prior to
Smith, the assumption that strict scrutiny universally applied to free exercise
claims was regarded with approval by virtually everyone, "from the ACLU to the
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terizing prior free exercise jurisprudence as actually standing for the
principal that a neutral law "of general applicability need not be justi-
fied by a compelling governmental interest"5 even where the law pro-
hibits a person from doing something his religion demands or requires
him to do something that his religion forbids.6 While this general rule
threatened to leave religious liberty vulnerable to frequent limitation,
the Smith Court carved out a narrow exception that still left some bite
in the Free Exercise Clause. Under the so-called hybrid-rights excep-
tion to Smith's general rule, neutral and generally applicable laws are
still subject to strict scrutiny review when they implicate not only the
claimant's free exercise rights but "other constitutional protections" as
well. 7 In particular, the hybrid-rights exception accommodates
landmark cases in which the Supreme Court used heightened scrutiny
to review laws burdening both free exercise rights and parental
rights.8
The Nebraska Supreme Court was called upon to consider this ex-
act combination of rights, and thus the applicability of the hybrid-
rights exception, when it heard Douglas County v. Anaya.9 In Anaya,
an infant's parents refused to comply with Nebraska's mandatory
metabolic testing law on the grounds that the law conflicted with their
religious beliefs regarding the proper care of their child. The Ne-
braska Supreme Court struggled to make sense of the muddled hy-
religious right"); see also Bradley P. Jacob, Free Exercise in the "Lobbying Nine-
ties," 84 NEB. L. REV. 795, 809 (2006) (explaining that "[t]o just about everyone's
surprise" the Smith Court jettisoned [strict scrutiny] and came up with a new
regime for evaluating free exercise claims, one that was much more deferential
to government interests"). Perhaps the best illustration of the dramatic shift
brought about by Smith, is the case of Yang v. Sturner, 750 F. Supp. 558 (D.R.I.
1990). In Yang, Judge Pettine of the United States District Court for the District
of Rhode Island was forced to vacate an opinion he wrote just before Smith was
announced. Although in his prior opinion Judge Pettine had found for the relig-
ious claimants by applying strict scrutiny, he acknowledged that under Smith,
"the compelling interest test . . . is no longer to be used when a generally applica-
ble law affects religious conduct." Id. at 559. Therefore, 'with deep regret," he
concluded: "[T]he Employment Division case mandates that I recall my prior
opinion." Id. at 558.
5. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531
(1993) (citing Smith, 494 U.S. at 879).
6. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 879.
7. Id. at 881.
8. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233 (1972) ("[Wlhen the interests of
parenthood are combined with a free exercise claim ... more than merely a 'rea-
sonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the State' is required to
sustain the validity of the State's [law] under the First Amendment." (emphasis
added)); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165 (1944) ("The parent's conflict
with the state over control of the child ... is serious enough when only secular
matters are concerned. It becomes the more so when an element of religious con-
viction enters." (emphasis added)).
9. 269 Neb. 552, 694 N.W.2d 601, cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 365 (2005) (mem.).
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brid-rights concept and consequently erred in applying the exception
when it held that neutral and generally applicable laws need not be
subjected to strict scrutiny review, even where such laws implicate
both free exercise rights and parental rights.10 Accordingly, the court
affirmed the district court's order that the Anayas immediately sub-
mit their child for the requisite metabolic testing.1
This Note focuses on the narrow question of what approach to hy-
brid-rights claims the Nebraska Supreme Court should have used to
evaluate the Anayas' claim and illustrates how the proper approach
would have affected the outcome in Anaya. Part II of this Note pro-
vides a legal background for hybrid-rights claims and an explanation
of Douglas County v. Anaya, including the factual background and the
court's holding. In Part III, this Note demonstrates that the three
mainstream lower court approaches to the hybrid-rights exception are
all flawed, and that the Nebraska Supreme Court erred in failing to
adopt the "genuinely-implicated" approach to hybrid-rights claims.12
Part III continues by showing that the Anayas would have obtained
strict scrutiny review of Nebraska's metabolic testing law had the Ne-
braska Supreme Court used the genuinely-implicated approach. Fi-
nally, Part IV concludes by emphasizing that the Nebraska Supreme
Court's failure to use the appropriate approach to hybrid-rights claims
represents an erroneous rejection of historically significant constitu-
tional interests that, unfortunately, will likely be repeated by other
courts.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Legal Landscape of Hybrid-Rights Claims
Before engaging in a critical analysis of the approaches that courts
use to determine whether the hybrid-rights exception is applicable, it
is necessary to explain the legal landscape of hybrid-rights claims in
general, and of free exercise and parental rights hybrids in particular.
Accordingly, the following section (1) details the textual origin of the
10. Id. at 557, 694 N.W.2d at 605.
11. Id. at 563, 694 N.W.2d at 610.
12. The "genuinely-implicated" approach is, as the name implies, an implication-
based approach to hybrid-rights claims. The basis for this approach is mainly my
own reading of Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith,
494 U.S. 872 (1990); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); and Prince v. Mas-
sachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944). Remarkably, upon reading Hicks ex rel. Hicks v.
Halifax County Board of Education, 93 F. Supp. 2d 649 (E.D.N.C. 1999), I discov-
ered that Judge Britt of the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of North Carolina seems to share many of my opinions on the subject. Unfortu-
nately, Judge Britt neglected to name or fully develop his approach to hybrid-
rights claims in Hicks. Drawing on the language and spirit of that case, I devised
the name and framework for an approach to hybrid-rights claims that I hope hon-
ors the conclusions of Judge Britt and the underlying hybrid-rights precedent.
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hybrid-rights exception, (2) introduces the various ways that lower
courts have applied the exception, and (3) briefly showcases the his-
torical underpinnings of the application of heightened scrutiny to joint
free exercise and parental rights claims.
1. The Smith General Rule and the Origin of the Hybrid-Rights
Exception
As stated above, Employment Division, Department of Human Re-
sources v. Smith forced a paradigm shift in how scholars, litigants,
and judges view the Free Exercise Clause. 13 In Smith, the Supreme
Court considered whether a state criminal law prohibiting the inges-
tion of peyote violated the free exercise rights of Alfred Smith and Ga-
len Black, two members of the Native American Church. 14 Smith and
Black, who were drug counselors, were fired and subsequently denied
unemployment compensation after their employer discovered that
they had consumed peyote during a religious ceremony.15 In rejecting
Smith and Black's assertion that strict scrutiny review applied to the
case, the Supreme Court held that a "neutral law of general applica-
bility,"16 like Oregon's criminal proscription of peyote, need not be jus-
tified by a compelling governmental interest.17 This has been taken to
mean that only rational basis review's applies to neutral and gener-
ally applicable laws that happen to incidentally burden a claimant's
free exercise rights. 19 Under Smith's general rule, a challenge based
on the Free Exercise Clause will only invoke strict scrutiny review 20
13. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
14. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 874.
15. See id.
16. Id. at 879.
17. Id. at 882.
18. Rational basis review is the lowest level of constitutional scrutiny. Under ra-
tional basis review, a challenged law will be found constitutional provided it "(1)
... is enacted in pursuit of a legitimate governmental interest[,] and (2) .. .is
reasonably related to that interest." Heather M. Good, Comment, "The Forgotten
Child of Our Constitution". The Parental Free Exercise Right to Direct the Educa-
tion and Religious Upbringing of Children, 54 EMORY L.J. 641, 644 (2005). Ra-
tional basis review is "enormously deferential" to governments, and laws very
rarely fail to pass constitutional muster under this level of judicial scrutiny. See
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 518 (2d ed.
2002).
19. See, e.g., Tenafly Eruv Ass'n v. Borough of Tenafly, 309 F.3d 144, 165 (3d Cir.
2002) (holding that rational basis review applies to neutral, generally applicable
laws that burden religion (citing Smith, 494 U.S. at 879)); Miller v. Reed, 176
F.3d 1202, 1206 (9th Cir. 1999) (same).
20. Strict scrutiny is the highest level of judicial scrutiny. Under strict scrutiny, a
law will be found unconstitutional unless the law is (1) enacted in pursuit of a
compelling governmental interest and (2) narrowly tailored in achieving the as-
serted interest. See Good, supra note 18, at 645. Unlike rational basis review,
laws reviewed with strict scrutiny are frequently declared unconstitutional, and
2006]
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when the law in question is a seemingly intentional burden on relig-
ious interests. 2 1 Because neutrality and general applicability will
only be violated by laws that fairly flagrantly discriminate against re-
ligion,2 2 and because only naive legislatures would draft such laws, 23
rational basis review is likely to apply to the majority of free exercise
claims.24
Immediately after articulating the Smith general rule, the Court
identified a narrow exception when it noted that
[t]he only decisions in which we have held that the First Amendment bars
application of a neutral, generally applicable law to religiously motivated ac-
tion have involved not the Free Exercise Clause alone, but the Free Exercise
Clause in conjunction with other constitutional protections, such as freedom of
speech and of the press ... or the right[s] of parents. 2 5
Later the Court named this exception by noting that it was not appli-
cable in Smith itself, because the case did not "present such a hybrid
situation."26
2. Applying the Hybrid-Rights Exception
Unfortunately, other than the few lines quoted above, the Smith
Court never said much else about the hybrid-rights exception. As a
result, the Smith Court's explanation of the hybrid-rights exception is
somewhat ambiguous, making it difficult for lower courts to under-
thus this level of scrutiny is far more protective of individual rights and liberties.
See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 18, at 520.
21. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531
(1993). For an extensive analysis of this aspect of Smith, see Richard F. Duncan,
Free Exercise is Dead, Long Live Free Exercise: Smith, Lukumi and the General
Applicability Requirement, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 850, 865 (2001) [hereinafter
Duncan, Long Live Free Exercise]. Along with non-neutral laws, Smith held that
where a public entity "has in place a system of individualized exemptions" from a
law or policy, any refusal to extend an exemption in "cases of religious hardship"
will be reviewed with strict scrutiny. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 884 (citing Bowen v.
Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 708 (1986)). Professor Duncan provides a comprehensive anal-
ysis of this aspect of Smith as well. See generally Richard F. Duncan, Free Exer-
cise and Individualized Exemptions: Herein of Smith, Sherbert, Hogwarts, and
Religious Liberty, 83 NEB. L. REV. 1178 (2005).
22. See Duncan, Long Live Free Exercise, supra note 21, at 865 (noting that the neu-
trality requirement in particular will be satisfied by most laws, except those
which directly discriminate against religion).
23. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 894 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[Flew States would be so
naive as to enact a law directly prohibiting or burdening a religious
practice . . ").
24. Id. (predicting that the Smith rule will have a broad sweep because prior Su-
preme Court "free exercise cases have all concerned generally applicable laws"
(emphasis added)).
25. Id. at 881 (majority opinion) (citations omitted).
26. Id. at 882 (emphasis added).
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stand and apply. 27 In addition to the ambiguity inherent in the Smith
hybrid-rights passage, many debate the logic behind the exception. 28
The controversy surrounding Smith's hybrid-rights passage has given
rise to considerable disagreement among lower courts about whether
the hybrid-rights exception exists at all, and if so, how to apply it.29 A
small minority of courts refuse to recognize the hybrid-rights excep-
tion and apply only rational basis review to cases implicating the Free
Exercise Clause and a companion right.30 In contrast, the majority of
lower courts believe that Smith mandates strict scrutiny review when-
ever the hybrid-rights exception is triggered,31 but even these courts
disagree on "what a plaintiff must show to justify [the exception's] ap-
plication."32 Specifically, these courts disagree about how strong the
companion claim must be in order to "hybridize" with a free exercise
claim and thus trigger the exception.3 3
Despite the disagreement among courts that recognize the hybrid-
rights exception, there are two key points on which these courts do
agree: First, any approach to hybrid-rights claims must preserve the
27. See Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 165 F.3d 692, 703 (9th Cir.
1999) (describing the Smith Court's explanation of the hybrid-rights exception as
"cryptic"), vacated on other grounds, 220 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2000); Swanson ex
rel. Swanson v. Guthrie Indep. Sch. Dist. No. I-L, 135 F.3d 694, 699-700 (10th
Cir. 1998) (concluding that "[ilt is difficult to delineate the exact contours of the
hybrid-rights theory discussed in Smith" and noting the resulting "difficulty of
applying the Smith exception").
28. See Jacob, supra note 4, at 812 (describing the idea that the hybrid-rights excep-
tion leads to strict scrutiny as "an unlikely interpretation of the Supreme Court's
current jurisprudence"); see also Grace United Methodist Church v. City of Chey-
enne, 427 F.3d 775, 789 (10th Cir. 2005) (describing the hybrid-rights exception
as "controversial").
29. See Grace, 427 F.3d at 789 (surveying the disagreement among the federal courts
of appeals).
30. See Leebaert v. Harrington, 332 F.3d 134, 144 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that strict
scrutiny does not apply to hybrid-rights claims); Kissinger v. Bd. of Trs., 5 F.3d
177, 180 (6th Cir. 1993) (same).
31. See, e.g., Hicks ex rel. Hicks v. Halifax County Bd. of Educ., 93 F. Supp. 2d 649,
662-63 (E.D.N.C. 1999) (noting that "[bly distinguishing the hybrid-rights cases,
rather than overruling them, Smith suggested that its general rule would not be
applicable to hybrid cases" and therefore that "strict scrutiny is applicable in hy-
brid-rights cases"). Accord Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chi., 342
F.3d 752, 764 (7th Cir. 2003) (explaining that the Smith Court held that success-
ful invocations of hybrid-rights will result in strict scrutiny review of neutral and
generally applicable laws); Tenafly Eruv Ass'n v. Borough of Tenafly, 309 F.3d
144, 165 n.26 (3d Cir. 2002) (same); Thomas, 165 F.3d at 711-12 (same); Swan-
son, 135 F.3d at 699-700 (same).
32. Hicks, 93 F. Supp. 2d at 661. See also Thomas, 165 F.3d at 703 ("[Tjhe courts of
appeals have struggled to decipher Smith's hybrid-rights formula and have
reached divergent conclusions as to exactly what constitutes a hybrid-rights
claim.").
33. See Grace, 427 F.3d at 789.
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exception as a rare departure from the Smith rule.3 4 Therefore, the
idea that a party may trigger the exception by merely alleging a viola-
tion of free exercise rights and one other constitutional right is univer-
sally rejected.3 5 Second, the most important factor in assessing the
validity of an approach to hybrid-rights claims is its "consistency with
Supreme Court precedent." 36
All told, four distinct approaches to hybrid-rights claims have
emerged among lower courts.3 7 Because the best approach to hybrid-
rights claims should contain both of the aforementioned traits, they
serve as the criteria used in the critical appraisal of each approach
that follows later in this Note.38 Before undertaking this critical anal-
ysis, it is first necessary to briefly explain how each approach works.
a. The "Refusal-to-Recognize" Approach
Under this approach, the assertion that the challenged law in-
fringes both free exercise and parental rights has no unique effect and
will not result in strict scrutiny review. 39 The refusal-to-recognize ap-
34. See, e.g., Littlefield v. Forney Indep. Sch. Dist., 108 F. Supp. 2d 681, 706 (N.D.
Tex. 2000) ("It must be kept in mind that Smith is the general rule, and excep-
tions will not be easily found.").
35. See, e.g., Thomas, 165 F.3d at 705 (noting that, in determining whether the hy-
brid-rights exception applies, courts cannot rest on the "bald assertion[s]" of the
parties, because doing so would result in the hybrid-rights exception applying in
virtually every free exercise case); Swanson, 135 F.3d at 699 (noting that, how-
ever courts decide that the hybrid-rights exception will be triggered, allowing
parties to trigger the hybrid-rights exception by "simply raising such a claim"
would turn the exception into "a talisman that automatically leads to the applica-
tion of the compelling-interest test").
36. Thomas, 165 F.3d at 706. In Thomas, the Ninth Circuit went on to note that, in
articulating or applying an approach to hybrid-rights claims, a court's job "is not
to critique or to deconstruct; [but] is to make sense of a confusing doctrinal situa-
tion-to make the pieces fit." Id. at 704 n.8 (emphasis added).
37. The names used to identify the lower court approaches to hybrid-rights claims in
the following subsections are borrowed from Jonathan Hensley. In his article,
Hensley identifies the "refusal-to-recognize," "independently-viable-claim," and
"colorable-claim" approaches, and traces their jurisprudential origins. See
Jonathan B. Hensley, Comment, Approaches to the Hybrid-Rights Doctrine in
Free Exercise Cases, 68 TENN. L. REV. 119, 128-38 (2000). That article provides
useful background information on the various approaches to hybrid-rights cases.
Unfortunately, Hensley missed the opportunity to comment on what I call the
'genuinely-implicated" approach, when he mischaracterized Hicks ex rel. Hicks v.
Halifax County Board of Education, 93 F. Supp. 2d 649 (E.D.N.C. 1999), the ma-
jor inspiration behind the genuinely-implicated standard, as a case that essen-
tially adopted the colorable-claim approach. See Hensley, supra, at 137
(suggesting that Hicks adopted "the substance of [the 'colorable claim'] standard,
even though it did not use the colorable claim terminology"). This conclusion is
debatable. See infra note 78.
38. See supra sections III.A-B.
39. See Leebaert v. Harrington, 332 F.3d 134, 143 (2d Cir. 2003) ("Given our under-
standing of the Smith [hybrid-rights] statement as dicta, we are not bound, as the
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proach was first used by the Sixth Circuit in Kissinger v. Board of
Trustees,40 when the court refused to apply the hybrid-rights excep-
tion to a student's challenge to a public university policy. In that case,
the Sixth Circuit expressed its opinion that it is "completely illogical"
for the level of judicial scrutiny to change depending on the number of
constitutional rights at stake.4 1 As a result, the court refuses to recog-
nize the hybrid-rights exception until the Supreme Court clarifies the
Smith hybrid-rights passage further.42 In addition to the Sixth Cir-
cuit, the Second Circuit 4 3 and Missouri Supreme Court 4 4 have also
adopted this view of the hybrid-rights passage from Smith and refuse
to recognize the exception.
b. The "Independently-Viable-Claim" Approach
According to this approach, the hybrid-rights exception is only trig-
gered when a free exercise claim is combined with a companion right
that has been independently violated.4 5 In other words, the hybrid-
rights exception will not apply unless the challenged law or conduct
will be found unconstitutional under the companion claim alone, with-
out regard to the free exercise interests involved. Not only is this a
First, Ninth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits seem to perceive themselves to be, to apply
some stricter standard of review than the rational basis test to hybrid claims.").
40. 5 F.3d 177 (6th Cir. 1993). Curiously, after Kissinger, the Sixth Circuit has been
somewhat inconsistent in its treatment of the hybrid-rights exception. Compare
Ohio Ass'n of Indep. Schs. v. Goff, 92 F.3d 419, 423 (6th Cir. 1996) ("The Supreme
Court has applied strict scrutiny to such Fourteenth Amendment claims [as pa-
rental rights] where they are coupled with a challenge based on the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment." (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233
(1972))), with Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 240
F.3d 553, 561 (6th Cir. 2001) ("[We do not believe the Court held [in Smith], nor
has it ever held, that a different level of scrutiny applies to laws that potentially
affect hybrid rights."), rev'd on other grounds, 536 U.S. 150 (2002).
41. Kissinger, 5 F.3d at 180.
42. Id. ('[Alt least until the Supreme Court holds that legal standards under the Free
Exercise Clause vary depending on whether other constitutional rights are impli-
cated, we will not use a stricter legal standard than that used in Smith to evalu-
ate generally applicable, exceptionless state regulations under the Free Exercise
Clause.").
43. See Leebaert, 332 F.3d. at 144 ("We too can think of no good reason for the stan-
dard of review to vary simply with the number of constitutional rights that the
plaintiff asserts have been violated." (citing Kissinger, 5 F.3d at 180)).
44. See Blakely v. Blakely, 83 S.W.3d 537, 547-48 (Mo. 2002) (en banc) (citing Kis-
singer with approval and holding that it will not recognize the Smith hybrid-
rights exception because 'there is no logical reason to require strict scrutiny
when both religious and parental control issues are considered together").
45. See Brown v. Hot, Sexy & Safer Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 539 (1st Cir. 1995)
(refusing to apply the hybrid-rights exception to plaintiffs' claims on the grounds
that the plaintiffs' 'free exercise challenge is ... not conjoined with an indepen-
dently protected constitutional protection" because the court already concluded
that the challenged school policy was constitutional in light of the parents' paren-
tal rights claim by itself (emphasis added)).
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difficult standard for parties to meet, but it also makes the hybrid-
rights exception superfluous, since a finding that the companion claim
triggers the hybrid-rights exception is made only after the case has
effectively been resolved. In addition to the First Circuit, the District
of Columbia Circuit has also adopted this approach.46
c. The "Colorable-Claim" Approach
The term "colorable," as it relates to the hybrid-rights exception,
was first used by the Tenth Circuit in Swanson ex rel. Swanson v.
Guthrie Independent School District No. I-L.47 In that case, the Tenth
Circuit noted that "[wihatever the Smith hybrid-rights theory may ul-
timately mean, we believe that it at least requires a colorable showing
of infringement of recognized and specific constitutional rights."48 Es-
sentially, this early version of the colorable-claim standard had two
distinct elements: (i) there must have been a genuine infringement (ii)
of recognized and specific constitutional rights. In other words, origi-
nally a "colorable claim" was one in which both "the claimed rights"
and "the claimed infringements are genuine."4 9
Exactly what the Tenth Circuit meant by this language is difficult
to discern and depends entirely on what the court meant by "infringe-
ment." Because "colorable" is defined as "appearing to be true,"50 if
infringement means "violation," then Swanson stands for the princi-
pal that the hybrid-rights exception will only apply if a claimant
shows that the law at issue appears to violate the companion right.
Under this first reading of Swanson, the exception would conceivably
apply only when the law at issue is likely to be found unconstitutional
under the companion claim alone.
But if "infringement" means mere "encroachment," as it appears
to,51 then the Swanson court's colorable-claim standard merely re-
quires a claimant to show that the law at issue appears to encroach on
the asserted companion right. Because "encroach" is synonymous
with "intrude,"5 2 under this second reading of Swanson, the hybrid-
rights exception would conceivably apply if the law at issue represents
46. See EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 467 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (finding
hybrid-rights exception applied because plaintiffs' free exercise claim was joined
with an independent violation of the Establishment Clause).
47. 135 F.3d 694 (10th Cir. 1998).
48. Id. at 700 (emphasis added).
49. Id. at 699.
50. BLAci's LAW DICTIONARY 282 (8th ed. 2004). See also Thomas v. Anchorage
Equal Rights Comm'n, 165 F.3d 692, 705 (9th Cir. 1999) (defining "colorable" as
"seemingly valid and genuine"), vacated on other grounds, 220 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir.
2000).
51. Encroachment is defined as "[a]n infringement of another's rights." BLAci's LAw
DICTIONARY 568 (8th ed. 2004).
52. Id.
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a genuine intrusion into the companion right, leaving open the ques-
tion of whether the government's intrusion violates that companion
right or is justified in light of a compelling governmental interest.
This colorable-claim standard would focus on weeding out utterly friv-
olous companion claims, rather than screening against weak ones.5 3
Unfortunately, the Swanson court never definitively indicated
which of these two readings it had in mind. Since the companion
claim at issue in Swanson was not a genuine assertion of recognized
and specific constitutional rights,54 the court never had reason to ex-
plain what it meant by "infringement." As a result, Swanson gives
rise to two plausible, yet contradictory, interpretations of the colora-
ble-claim approach. In any event, whatever the Tenth Circuit may
have truly intended in Swanson became a moot point just one year
later when the Ninth Circuit proffered its own interpretation of the
colorable-claim standard in Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights
Commission .55
In Thomas, the Ninth Circuit heard a novel hybrid-rights claim in
which two Christian landlords, Kevin Thomas and Joyce Baker, re-
fused to lease apartments to unmarried couples because they believed
that cohabitation of unmarried individuals was sinful fornication.56
Thomas and Baker believed that they would facilitate sin by renting
to unmarried couples that planned to live together.57 Because state
and local laws prohibited discrimination in rental housing on the basis
of a prospective lessee's martial status, 58 Thomas and Baker brought
suit in federal court on the theory that the antidiscrimination laws
were unconstitutional.59 Alleging a hybrid-rights claim, the lan-
dloards argued that the laws at issue implicated the Free Exercise
53. Perhaps not coincidentally, in other cases decided in the same year as Swanson
the Tenth Circuit defined a "colorable" claim in other contexts as merely a non-
frivolous claim. See Harline v. DEA, 148 F.3d 1199, 1203 (10th Cir. 1998) (defin-
ing a "colorable" claim as one that is not "wholly insubstantial or frivolous");
United States v. McAleer, 138 F.3d 852, 857 (10th Cir. 1998) (defining a "colora-
ble" claim as one that has "some possible validity").
54. Swanson, 135 F.3d at 699 (holding that because "[t]he right to direct one's child's
education does not protect" the right to pick and choose classes a child will and
will not attend, plaintiffs had failed to invoke "recognized and specific constitu-
tional rights" as a companion claim).
55. 165 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1999), vacated on other grounds, 220 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir.
2000).
56. Id. at 696.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 697.
59. Id.
20061
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
Clause, the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment,60 and the Free
Speech Clause.6 1
Before reaching the merits of the landlords' claim, the Ninth Cir-
cuit had to determine what standard it would use to evaluate the ap-
plicability of the hybrid-rights exception. The Thomas court
characterized Swanson as requiring a "colorable claim" in order to
trigger the hybrid-rights exception and cited this proposition with ap-
proval. 6 2 The court then sought to resolve the ambiguity inherent in
Swanson, by defining "colorable claim" more concretely. After consid-
ering the many ways in which "colorable" is used in other areas of the
law, the Ninth Circuit concluded that a "colorable" companion claim is
one that has "'a fair probability'-a 'likelihood'-of success on the
merits."6 3 Rather than arise out of the language of Smith or other
hybrid-rights caselaw, the Ninth Circuit borrowed this test from the
standard courts use to determine whether a preliminary injunction is
warranted at the outset of a trial.64
Under the "likelihood-of-success-on-the-merits" standard, the hy-
brid-rights exception will not apply even if the challenged law impli-
cates a party's free exercise and a companion right.65 Instead, this
colorable-claim approach forces a party to demonstrate that the likeli-
hood of success on the merits of the companion claim alone "tips
sharply" in his favor. 66 In forcing a claimant to show that the law in
question likely violates the companion claim right, the Thomas court's
version of the colorable-claim approach is consistent with the first of
the two possible readings of Swanson sketched out above.
60. U.S. CONST. amend. V (providing "nor shall private property be taken for public
use, without just compensation"). Because the right of owners to exclude othersis "one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly
characterized as property," Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458
U.S. 419, 433 (1982), the Takings Clause is implicated whenever the government
compels an owner to admit people onto his land that the owner would prefer to
exclude.
61. Thomas, 165 F.3d at 702.
62. Id. at 705.
63. Id. at 705-06.
64. Id. at 706 ("Indeed, the colorable-claim standard we adopt today for evaluating
hybrid-rights claims is not altogether different from the traditional 'likelihood of
success on the merits' test that governs the issuance of preliminary injunctive
relief.").
65. See id. at 705 (relying on the logic of Justice Souter's concurring opinion from
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993), to
hold that "the mere fact that a companion right is 'implicated' cannot serve as the
touchstone for heightened scrutiny" because "[glovernment action will almost al-
ways 'implicate' a host of constitutional rights" and therefore, "under a permis-
sive 'implication' standard, rarely if ever would a neutral, generally applicable
law be subject to the general rule of Smith").
66. Id. at 706.
[Vol. 85:311
MAKING SENSE OF HYBRID RIGHTS
To determine whether this likelihood-of-success-on-the-merits test
has been met, a court must make "difficult, qualitative, case-by-case
judgments regarding the strength of [the] companion-claim[s]."67 The
Thomas case itself is perhaps the best example of how this analysis
should unfold. There the court began its colorable-claim analysis with
the plaintiffs' Takings Clause companion claim. After a lengthy dis-
cussion of the Supreme Court's takings precedent, 68 the court con-
cluded that the claim was colorable because the plaintiffs had made a
"substantial argument" that the laws at issue violated the Takings
Clause. 6 9
After a comprehensive analysis of the Supreme Court's free speech
jurisprudence,70 the court concluded that Thomas and Baker had al-
leged a colorable free speech companion claim as well. Since the an-
tidiscrimination laws at issue specifically prohibited landlords from
refusing to rent based on the lessees' marital status, the court con-
cluded that these laws intentionally discriminated against viewpoint
and were thus presumptively unconstitutional under the plaintiffs'
free speech claim. 7 1 In sum, because the laws at issue in Thomas
were likely to be found unconstitutional under either the takings
claim or the free speech claim by themselves, those companion claims
were both colorable, hybrid-worthy claims.
Since Thomas, both the Ninth and Tenth Circuit have regularly
applied the likelihood-of-success-on-the-merits test as part of their col-
orable-claim approach to the hybrid-rights exception. 7 2 In addition to
the Ninth and Tenth Circuits, a district court in the Third Circuit has
also adopted this approach. 73
67. Id. at 705.
68. Id. at 707-09.
69. Id. at 709.
70. Id. at 709-11.
71. Id. at 711 (citing R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992)).
72. See, e.g., Grace United Methodist Church v. City of Cheyenne, 427 F.3d 775, 789
(10th Cir. 2005) (using the likelihood-of-success-on-the-merits test in deciding
whether or not the hybrid-rights exception applies); San Jose Christian Coll. v.
City of Morgan Hill, 360 F.3d 1024, 1032 (9th Cir. 2004) (same). The original
Thomas opinion was vacated when the Ninth Circuit, rehearing the case en banc,
found that the case was not yet ripe for appellate review. Thomas v. Anchorage
Equal Rights Comm'n, 220 F.3d 1134, 1134 (9th Cir. 2000). Nonetheless, the va-
cated opinion provides a detailed explanation of the colorable-claim approach and
is still an oft-cited source of guidance for both the Ninth and Tenth Circuits as
they apply the colorable-claim approach in subsequent cases. See, e.g., Axson-
Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1295 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing the original
Thomas opinion for guidance in applying the colorable-claim approach); Miller v.
Reed, 176 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 1999) (same).
73. See Green v. City of Phil., No. Civ.A. 03-1476, 2004 WL 1170531, at *7 (E.D. Pa.
May 26, 2004).
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d. The "Genuinely-Implicated" Approach
Under this approach, a claimant will successfully invoke the hy-
brid-rights exception only when (i) the asserted companion claim is
one of three companion claims that, according to the Smith hybrid-
rights passage, merits heightened judicial scrutiny when combined
with a free exercise claim;7 4 and (ii) the claimant can demonstrate
that the challenged law or conduct genuinely implicates the asserted
companion claim right. The second prong of this standard occupies
the middle ground between, at one extreme, allowing a party to trig-
ger the hybrid-rights exception by merely alleging a violation of the
companion claim, and at the other extreme, forcing a party to show
that he has at least a likelihood of prevailing on the merits of the com-
panion claim alone.
Under an allegation-based standard, in which a court takes the
claimant at his word that his companion rights are implicated by the
challenged law, litigants have the power to determine if the exception
applies. This is undesirable because virtually every claimant would
take advantage of this fact by merely alleging a violation of hybrid-
rights. 75 In contrast, an implication-based standard gives the power
to the court to determine whether the exception applies.
Unlike the independently-viable-claim or colorable-claim ap-
proaches, a court using the genuinely-implicated standard need not
determine whether the asserted right has been violated, only that it is
genuinely implicated, as revealed by the apparent facts, evidence, and
relevant law. If the court determines that the challenged law or con-
duct legitimately implicates both the claimant's free exercise rights
and one of the companion claim rights identified in the Smith hybrid-
rights passage, the exception applies and strict scrutiny review should
follow. Whereas the Thomas court's colorable-claim approach is con-
sistent with the first of the two plausible readings of the Tenth Cir-
cuit's Swanson opinion, 7 6 this standard is very similar to the second
possible interpretation.
While the name and organizational framework of this approach are
a product of this Note, 7 7 the concept behind the approach was largely
inspired by Hicks ex rel. Hicks v. Halifax County Board of Educa-
74. These are (i) the First Amendment right to freedom of speech; (ii) the implied
First Amendment right to free association; and (iii) the Fourteenth Amendment
substantive due process right of parents to determine matters of custody, care,
and control of their children. For the precedential support behind the limitation
of hybrids-rights to these three companion claims, see infra notes 167-69 and
accompanying text.
75. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
76. See supra subsection II.A.2.c.
77. See supra note 12.
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tion.7s In that case, the court considered a grandmother's joint paren-
tal rights and free exercise challenge to a school's mandatory uniform
policy. In support of the first prong of the genuinely-implicated ap-
proach, the Hicks court held that the hybrid-rights exception should
only apply when the claimant's companion claim is one of the "consti-
tutional interest[s] identified in [the] Smith[] hybrid-rights pas-
sage."79 The Hicks court inspired the second prong of the genuinely-
implicated approach when it noted that "the Smith Court's decision to
distinguish, rather than overrule, Yoder suggests its belief that a stat-
ute or policy that implicates ... free exercise and the parental right to
direct the religious upbringing of her children, necessitates the appli-
cation of heightened scrutiny."80 The court further noted that
"[w]hether or not the [companion] constitutional interest is indepen-
dently viable is not at issue. It is the mere presence of the interest, as
78. 93 F. Supp. 2d 649 (E.D.N.C. 1999). As demonstrated by Jonathan Hensley's
reading of Hicks, see supra note 37, there is room for debate as to whether Hicks
adopted the colorable-claim approach or articulated its own approach to hybrid-
rights claims. The ambiguity stems from the fact that the Hicks court first cited
the "genuine" and "infringement" language from Swanson, the original colorable-
claim case, see Hicks, 93 F. Supp. 2d at 660 n.9, then used this same "genuine"
and "infringement" language in articulating its own holding. See id. at 662 (hold-
ing that the hybrid-rights exception will only apply when the claimant shows a
"genuine claim of infringement" of specific constitutional rights). Yet the Hicks
court never expressly announced that it was adopting the colorable-claim stan-
dard. The Hicks court also did not analyze the plaintiffs companion claim to
determine if it alone had a likelihood of success on the merits, despite the fact
that the Hicks court cited Thomas, see id. at 660 n.9, the case that unambigu-
ously relied on the likelihood-of-success-on-the-merits test to evaluate the appli-
cability of the hybrid-rights exception. The uncertainty about whether Hicks
adopted the colorable-claim approach is undoubtedly the result of the two possi-
ble, yet contradictory, readings of the "genuine" and "infringement" language in
Swanson. See supra subsection II.A.2.c. As stated, in Thomas the Ninth Circuit
chose the first of the two plausible readings of Swanson and took the case to
mean that a "colorable claim" must itself have a likelihood of success on the mer-
its. See supra subsection II.A.2.c. The Hicks court appears to have adopted the
second reading of the "genuine" and "infringement" language from Swanson, by
holding that the exception applies when a claimant has a valid claim that the law
in question intrudes on the companion right, without regard to the independent
strength of that claim. See Hicks, 93 F. Supp. 2d at 662 ("Whether or not the
second constitutional interest is independently viable is not at issue. It is the
mere presence of the interest, as a genuine claim ... that triggers the heightened
scrutiny of the free exercise claim." (emphasis added)). Therefore, technically
speaking, Hicks may have in fact adopted the colorable-claim approach, but only
as it might have been originally understood under Swanson. Now that a "colora-
ble claim" must have a likelihood of success by itself in the post-Thomas legal
landscape, it is no longer accurate to say that Hicks adopted the colorable-claim
approach. Instead, Hicks-and in my opinion, Swanson itself-should be read as
advocating a standard that is entirely distinct from the Thomas court's definition
of "colorable claim."
79. Hicks, 93 F. Supp. 2d at 662.
80. Id. at 661 (emphasis added).
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a genuine claim ... that triggers the heightened scrutiny of the free
exercise claim."8 '
Because this approach did not formally exist before this Note, no
court has used it by name. However, a number of courts have used a
nearly identical analysis and found that the hybrid-rights exception
applies when a law or policy implicates both free exercise rights and
one of the companion-claim rights identified in the Smith hybrid-pas-
sage, seemingly without regard to the apparent strength of the com-
panion claim.8 2 Additionally, the Seventh Circuit gave favorable
treatment to the idea that the hybrid-rights exception applies when
the challenged law or conduct implicates both free exercise and one of
the companion claims identified in Smith.s 3
3. The Historical Significance of Joint Free Exercise and
Parental Rights Claims
Parental rights first gained constitutional significance in the
landmark Supreme Court case Meyer v. Nebraska.84 In that case, a
teacher who gave a student lessons in the German language was pun-
ished under a Nebraska law that proscribed educational instruction to
young children in any language other than English.85 While it was
the teacher-not the parents-who suffered criminal sanction, the
case nonetheless implicated parental rights because the teacher
taught German at the express request of the child's parents.8 6 The
Court noted that the interest of a parent in his or her child was akin to
the various liberty interests already associated with the substantive
component of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment8 7
81. Id. at 662 (emphasis added).
82. See Chalifoux v. New Caney Indep. Sch. Dist., 976 F. Supp. 659, 671 (S.D. Tex.
1997) (holding that school's policy prohibiting students from visibly displaying
their rosaries triggered the hybrid-rights exception because the policy implicated
both free exercise and free speech rights of the students); Alabama & Coushatta
Tribes v. Big Sandy Indep. Sch. Dist., 817 F. Supp. 1319, 1332 (E.D. Tex. 1993)
(applying strict scrutiny to a school district's requirement that male students
wear short hair to school because the requirement implicated both free exercise
and parental rights considerations, and thereby triggered the Smith hybrid-
rights exception).
83. See Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chi., 342 F.3d 752, 764 (7th Cir.
2003) ("In Smith, the Supreme Court noted that, in cases implicating the Free
Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional protections, such as free-
dom of speech and freedom of association, the First Amendment may subject.., a
neutral, generally applicable law to a heightened level of scrutiny." (emphasis
added)).
84. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
85. Id. at 397.
86. Id. at 400.
87. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (providing that "[n]o state shall ... deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law").
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and held that parents' rights also fell within the scope of that
amendment.8 8
Since Meyer, the importance of parent's constitutionally protected
liberty interest in their children has been repeatedly underscored.8 9
In terms of judicial scrutiny, the majority of courts hold that parents'
constitutionally protected interest in childrearing implicates only ra-
tional basis review where the parental objection is only secular in na-
ture.9 0 However, a clear line of precedent further indicates that
parents' constitutionally protected interest in their children merits
heightened scrutiny when parental objections are based on religious
convictions.
This line of precedent began with Prince v. Massachusetts.9 1 In
Prince, a woman was prosecuted under a state child labor law as the
guardian of a young girl who was allowed to sell religious literature on
public streets. Though the Court ultimately held that state interest in
protecting young children from labor outweighed the guardian's pa-
rental and religious interests at stake, it nonetheless noted that "[tihe
parent's conflict with the state over control of the child and his train-
ing is serious enough when only secular matters are concerned. It be-
comes the more so when an element of religious conviction enters."92
The idea that parental religious objections require more rigorous
judicial scrutiny than merely secular parental objections was reaf-
firmed in Wisconsin v. Yoder.93 In that case, the Supreme Court in-
validated a state compulsory education law in light of an Amish
parent's claim that the law conflicted with his ability to instill relig-
ious values in his children. The Court observed that where a parent
challenges a law only from a secular perspective, the law is constitu-
88. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 400 (discussing the various liberty interests that arise from
the Fourteenth Amendment and holding that "the right of parents to engage [the
teacher] so to instruct their children, we think, [is] within the liberty of the
amendment").
89. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (collecting cases).
90. See, e.g., Ohio Ass'n of Indep. Schs. v. Goff, 92 F.3d 419, 423 (6th Cir. 1996) (rely-
ing on Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), in holding that rational basis
review applies to "wholly secular" assertions of parental rights); Herndon ex rel.
Herndon v. Chapel Hill-Carrboro Bd. of Educ., 89 F.3d 174, 179 (4th Cir. 1996)
(relying on Yoder in holding that, other than "when the parents' interest ... in-
cludes a religious element, the Court has declared with equal consistency" that
rational basis review applies to parental rights assertions); Immediato v. Rye
Neck Sch. Dist., 73 F.3d 454, 461 (2d Cir. 1996) (applying rational basis review to
parents' claim that a child's participation in high school's compulsory community
service program violated their constitutional rights as parents); Littlefield v. For-
ney Indep. Sch. Dist., 108 F. Supp. 2d 681, 702-03 (N.D. Tex. 2000) (holding that
prior Supreme Court precedent, including Yoder, mandates rational basis review
where a parent challenges a law or policy on secular grounds).
91. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
92. Id. at 165 (emphasis added).
93. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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tional so long as it bears a reasonable relation to a valid governmental
purpose, and that under such a standard the compulsory education
law at issue was constitutional.9 4 However, the Court held that
"when the interests of parenthood are combined with a free exercise
claim,"95 the state must justify its laws with "more than merely a 'rea-
sonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the
State."' 96 The Court found that the compulsory education law was not
constitutional under the more rigorous judicial scrutiny required by
this unique combination of rights.97
Finally, the extra judicial respect afforded to religiously motivated
parental objections was reinforced by Employment Division, Depart-
ment of Human Resources v. Smith itself. In Smith, the Court offered
Yoder as the prime example of the principle that neutral laws of gen-
eral applicability will nonetheless be subjected to rigorous judicial
scrutiny when they simultaneously infringe on both free exercise and
parental rights.98 Read together, Prince, Yoder, and Smith strongly
indicate that joint parental autonomy and free exercise claims merit
heightened judicial respect. 99 It is within this legal landscape that
the Nebraska Supreme Court considered a parental religious objection
to Nebraska's metabolic testing law.
B. Douglas County v. Anaya
1. Facts
On July 11, 2003, Mary Anaya gave birth to Rosa Ariel Anaya in
the Anayas' home.10 0 There was no physician present at the birth and
the only witness was Rosa's father, Josue Anaya.1o1 The Anayas re-
ported the birth to the Department of Health and Human Services
94. Id. at 233 ("[Wlhere nothing more than the general interest of the parent in the
nurture and education of his children is involved, it is beyond dispute that the
State acts 'reasonably' and constitutionally in requiring education to age 16 in
some public or private school.").
95. Id.
96. Id. The "reasonable relations" language from Yoder is universally read as indi-
cating rational basis review. See supra note 90.
97. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 234.
98. See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990)
(citing Yoder as an example of a parental rights and free exercise hybrid claim).
99. See Hicks ex rel. Hicks v. Halifax County Bd. of Educ., 93 F. Supp. 2d 649, 661
(E.D.N.C. 1999) ("Whatever the hybrid-rights exception may mean in other con-
texts," Yoder indicates "that a statute or policy that implicates the particular
combination of rights at issue in that case, free exercise and the parental right to
direct the religious upbringing of her children, necessitates the application of
heightened scrutiny.").
100. Douglas County v. Anaya, 269 Neb. 552, 554, 694 N.W.2d 601, 604, cert. denied,
126 S. Ct. 365 (2005) (mem.).
101. Id.
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(DHHS) on July 17.102 On approximately August 26, 2003, the DHHS
sent a letter to the Anayas informing them that they had not yet com-
plied with Nebraska's metabolic screening lawlo 3 and instructing
them to do so.' 0 4 In addition to the letter, the DHHS included an ex-
planatory brochure detailing the metabolic testing process and ex-
plaining that a needle is used to extract blood from the heel of the
infant.105 In response, the Anayas sent a letter to the DHHS on Sep-
tember 2, 2003, indicating that they were formally refusing to submit
their daughter for metabolic testing 0 6 because, according to their
spiritual beliefs in the inherent ethereal properties of blood, any blood
taken from their daughter would cause a reduction in her life span. 0 7
To force the Anayas' compliance with the metabolic testing law,
Douglas County filed a petition in the District Court for Douglas
County, Nebraska, on September 24, 2003.108 The Anayas responded
by filing a motion for judicial exception from the metabolic testing law
on the grounds that, without a religious exception, the law impermis-
sibly infringed on their First Amendment rights to free exercise of re-
ligion and their Fourteenth Amendment rights as parents.1 0 9 At trial,
the court agreed that the Anayas' claims warranted strict scrutiny re-
view of the compulsory metabolic testing law.llo Nonetheless, the
court found that the significance of the Anayas' beliefs did not out-
weigh the State's interest in protecting all of its children through
early detection of metabolic disorders. Accordingly, the court con-
cluded that the First and Fourteenth Amendments did not require Ne-
braska to have a judicial exception to its metabolic testing law."'
Moreover, the court found that the Anayas' compliance with the meta-
bolic testing law was not a moot issue simply because the requisite
102. Id.
103. The metabolic testing law is codified at NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-519 (Supp. 2005). It
provides, in pertinent part:
(1) All infants born in the State of Nebraska shall be screened for
phenylketonuria, primary hypothryroidism, biotinidase deficiency,
galactosemia, hemoglobinopathies, medium-chain acyl co-a
dehydrogenase (MCAD) deficiency .... (2) The attending physician shall
collect or cause to be collected the prescribed blood specimen .... If a
birth is not attended by a physician and the infant does not have a physi-
cian, the person registering the birth shall cause such tests to be per-
formed within the period and in the manner prescribed by the
department.
104. Douglas County v. Anaya, No. 1030, slip op. at 1-2 (Douglas County Dist. Ct. Dec.
19, 2003).
105. Anaya, 269 Neb. at 554, 694 N.W.2d at 604.
106. Anaya, No. 1030, slip op. at 2.
107. Anaya, 269 Neb. at 554, 694 N.W.2d at 604.
108. Anaya, No. 1030, slip op. at 2.
109. Id. at 2-3.
110. Id. at 3-4.
111. Anaya, 269 Neb. at 555, 694 N.W.2d at 604.
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forty-eight hour period had long since passed.112 Consequently, the
court ordered the Anayas to submit Rose for the requisite testing
without delay.113
The Anayas immediately appealed the district court's decision to
the Nebraska Court of Appeals. However, on January 2, 2004, Doug-
las County filed a Petition to Bypass with the Nebraska Supreme
Court, asking the court to hear the case on direct appeal from the dis-
trict court.114 The petition was granted and the case came before the
Nebraska Supreme Court for oral argument on February 3, 2005.
2. Holding
The Anayas' case presented three possible ways in which strict
scrutiny review of Nebraska's metabolic testing law might be re-
quired: (i) as a result of the law's infringement of the Anayas' free
exercise rights, without regard to other constitutional claims; (ii) as a
result of the law's infringement of the Anayas' parental rights claim
without regard to the religious interests involved; or (iii) as a result of
the law's infringement of a combination of the Anayas' free exercise
and parental rights (i.e. a hybrid-rights claim).
With respect to free exercise interests alone, the Nebraska Su-
preme Court stated that the relevant question was whether or not the
metabolic testing law "is neutral and has general application."' 1 5
Without much discussion, the court concluded that the law was "a
neutral law of general applicability" because it "is generally applicable
to all babies born in the state and does not discriminate as to which
babies must be tested. Its purpose is not directed at religious prac-
tices or beliefs." 116 The court therefore held that rational basis re-
view-not strict scrutiny-would apply to the Anayas' free exercise
claim when considered independently.117
The next question in Anaya was whether or not the Anayas' Four-
teenth Amendment liberty interest in parenting their child invoked
strict scrutiny review of the metabolic testing law. In addressing this
question, the court did not deny that the Anayas' challenge to the met-
abolic testing law fell within the scope of parents' constitutionally pro-
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. See Petition to Bypass, Douglas County v. Anaya, 269 Neb. 552, 694 N.W.2d 601
(2005) (No. A-03-001446).
115. Anaya, 269 Neb. at 559, 694 N.W.2d at 607.
116. Id. at 560, 694 N.W.2d at 608.
117. Id. at 561, 694 N.W.2d at 608. This Note does not take issue with the court's
conclusion that the Anayas' free exercise claim alone does not implicate strict
scrutiny, as it is clear that section 71-519 is a neutral and generally applicable
law, and thus warrants only rational basis review.
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tected substantive due process interest in their children.1 ' 8 Instead,
the court held that the Anayas' assertion of parental rights only in-
voked rational basis review since "the [Supreme] Court has never held
that parental rights to childrearing as guaranteed under the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the 14th Amendment must be subjected to strict
scrutiny."119
Having concluded that neither claim individually warranted strict
scrutiny review, the only question remaining before the court was
whether the combination of the Anayas' free exercise and parental in-
terests triggered strict scrutiny review as a hybrid-rights claim. In
disposing of the Anayas' hybrid-rights claim, the court held that it did
not read Smith as supporting the Anayas' claim concerning strict scrutiny.
Although Smith discussed prior decisions that involved not only the Free Ex-
ercise Clause but other constitutional provisions, the Court did not hold that a
strict scrutiny review is required simply because more than one constitutional
right might be implicated.
1 2 0
The exact basis for the Nebraska Supreme Court's rejection of the
Anayas' hybrid-rights claim is unclear.121 What is clear, however, is
that the court rejected the logic of the genuinely-implicated approach.
118. This point is significant because the court could have held that the Anaya's inter-
est as parents in this case does not even fall within the scope of parent's constitu-
tionally protected interests in their children under the Fourteenth Amendment.
See infra note 196.
119. Anaya, 269 Neb. at 559, 694 N.W.2d at 607 (citing Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S.
57 (2000)). This Note also does not contest the court's conclusion that assertions
of parental rights (without any consideration of other constitutional rights) impli-
cate only rational basis review. In addition to requiring its own lengthy discus-
sion, the proper level of judicial scrutiny applied to secular parental rights
assertions is beyond the scope of this Note. Other scholars provide an excellent
analysis of this subject. See, e.g., Stephen G. Gilles, Parental (and Grandparen-
tal) Rights After Troxel v. Granville, 9 Sup. CT. ECON. REV. 69 (2001).
120. Anaya, 269 Neb. at 557, 694 N.W.2d at 605.
121. It is not clear from the court's opinion whether it was adopting the colorable-
claim approach to hybrid-rights claims, or whether it was refusing to recognize
the hybrid-rights exception in general. The court first noted the Tenth and Ninth
Circuits' colorable-claim approach, see id. at 557, 694 N.W.2d at 606 (citing Miller
v. Reed, 176 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 1999); Swanson ex rel. Swanson v. Guthrie
Indep. Sch. Dist. No. I-L, 135 F.3d 694, 700 (10th Cir. 1998)), then noted that the
Sixth Circuit refuses to recognize the exception at all, see id. at 558, 694 N.W.2d
at 606 (citing Kissinger v. Bd. of Trs., 5 F.3d 177, 180 (6th Cir. 1993)). Unfortu-
nately, after surveying these two approaches to the hybrid-rights exception, the
Nebraska Supreme Court never explicitly identified which approach it relied on
in resolving the case. Moreover, the court's only explicit holding-that the hy-
brid-rights exception does not apply simply because more than one right might be
implicated-is a proposition that the colorable-claim and refusal-to-recognize
courts would both agree with. As a result, reasonable minds could differ about
whether the court actually used the Ninth and Tenth Circuits' colorable-claim
approach or instead adopted the Sixth Circuit's refusal-to-recognize approach. In
the end, the exact basis for the Nebraska Supreme Court's rejection of the
Anayas' hybrid-rights claim is a moot point since this Note demonstrates that the
refusal-to-recognize and colorable-claim approaches are both flawed. As a final
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After disposing of each of the three possible ways strict scrutiny
review might apply based on the Anayas' claims, the Nebraska Su-
preme Court concluded that "the effect of [Nebraska's metabolic test-
ing law] upon the constitutional claims the Anayas have asserted is
properly analyzed under a rational basis review."122 Under the ra-
tional basis test, the court held that the "State has an interest in the
health and welfare of all children born in Nebraska" and because com-
pulsory metabolic testing was reasonably related to that interest, the
court held that the law "is constitutional" even without a religious
exception.123
III. ANALYSIS
This Part demonstrates that the Nebraska Supreme Court's rejec-
tion of the genuinely-implicated approach, and resulting failure to ap-
ply strict scrutiny review to the Anayas' joint parental rights and free
exercise claim, was in error. Regardless of which approach to hybrid-
rights claims the Nebraska Supreme Court actually relied on, the
court should have adopted the genuinely-implicated approach.
Whereas alternative approaches to the hybrid-rights exception di-
rectly contradict hybrid-rights precedent, the genuinely-implicated
approach aligns perfectly with the Supreme Court's hybrid-rights case
law and therefore accurately reflects the logic implicit in those cases.
Had the Nebraska Supreme Court adopted the genuinely-implicated
approach to hybrid claims, it would have found that the Anayas' relig-
iously grounded parental objection warranted strict scrutiny review of
Nebraska's metabolic testing law.
A. The Three Mainstream Approaches to the Hybrid-Rights
Exception are Inherently Flawed
As noted earlier, the federal courts of appeals employ three distinct
approaches to the hybrid-rights exception: (a) the refusal-to-recognize
approach, (b) the independently-viable-claim approach, and (c) the col-
matter, the confusion inherent in the court's opinion is undoubtedly a direct re-
sult of the fact the hybrid-rights exception is a "confusing doctrinal situation,"
Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 165 F.3d 692, 704 (9th Cir. 1999),
vacated on other grounds, 220 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2000). The ambiguity of the
Smith opinion itself, see supra note 27 and accompanying text, is compounded by
the divergent conclusions of the federal courts of appeals, see supra notes 29, 32
and accompanying text. The result is that courts freshly entering the hybrid-
rights fray-like the Nebraska Supreme Court-are charged with the near-im-
possible task of making sense of this mess. If this Note does not help foster a
consensus on the correct approach to hybrid-rights claims, my hope is that it will
at least help practitioners, courts, and commentators understand the debate
more clearly.
122. Anaya, 269 Neb. at 561, 694 N.W.2d at 608.
123. Id.
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orable-claim approach.12 4 The following subsections will demonstrate
that each of those approaches is fundamentally flawed and therefore
unfit for use in determining whether the hybrid-rights exception ap-
plies to any given case.
1. The Refusal-to-Recognize Approach Ignores Binding Precedent
and Contradicts the Conclusions of the Majority of
Jurisdictions
The first major problem with the refusal-to-recognize approach is
that it fails to adequately reconcile the holdings in Wisconsin v. Yoder
and Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith.
If refusal-to-recognize courts accept Smith's general rule that neutral
laws of general applicability receive only rational basis review125 then
they cannot logically explain Yoder, a case in which the Supreme
Court applied strict scrutiny 126 to a law that was neutral and gener-
ally applicable.1 27 Because Smith did not overrule Yoder, 128 courts
have only two options in reconciling these two cases: (i) refuse to rec-
ognize both the hybrid-rights exception and the Smith general rule,
thus explaining Yoder as consistent with the principle that even inci-
dental burdens to religious exercise warrant strict scrutiny; or (ii) ac-
cept the Smith general rule and acknowledge that Yoder stands for
the hybrid-rights exception.
The first option is impossible because it requires a rejection of
clearly articulated Supreme Court precedent.129 Thus the second op-
tion, recognizing both the Smith rule and the hybrid-rights exception,
is the only tenable combined reading of Smith and Yoder. If courts
simply adopt Smith's characterization of the Free Exercise Clause but
reject the hybrid-rights exception, then it is impossible to explain the
outcome in Yoder.13 0
124. See supra subsections II.A.2.a-c.
125. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
126. The Yoder Court required Wisconsin to show more than "merely a 'reasonable
relation to some competency within the state'" to justify the compulsory educa-
tion law at issue. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233 (1972). This lan-
guage from Yoder is universally regarded as referring to strict scrutiny review.
See, e.g., Ohio Ass'n of Indep. Schs. v. Goff, 92 F.3d 419, 423 (6th Cir. 1996) (cit-
ing Yoder, 406 U.S. at 233).
127. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 219-20 (indicating that Wisconsin's compulsory education,
in being applied equally to every child in Wisconsin, is "neutral on its face" and of
"general applicability").
128. Hicks ex rel. Hicks v. Halifax County Bd. of Educ., 93 F. Supp. 2d 649, 661
(E.D.N.C. 1999) (noting that the Smith court chose to "distinguish, rather than
overrule, Yoder").
129. Smith undeniably rejects the idea that strict scrutiny applies to neutral and gen-
erally applicable laws. See supra notes 17, 19 and accompanying text.
130. See Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 165 F.3d 692, 704 (9th Cir.
1999) ("Although undoubtedly the path of least resistance, there is a salient prob-
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Because Smith preserved Yoder,1 31 and because Supreme Court
holdings are binding until the Court expressly overrules them,132
lower courts must accept Smith's characterization of Yoder and
thereby apply its hybrid-rights concept,13 3 even if they disagree with
its logic. 1 3 4 Therefore, until the Supreme Court expressly changes its
interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause, lower courts have the duty
"to give meaning to the seemingly impenetrable hybrid-rights excep-
tion by applying the law to the facts before it."135 The refusal-to-rec-
ognize approach is flawed because it ignores this principle.
The second major problem with the refusal-to-recognize approach
is that it runs counter to the conclusions reached by the overwhelming
majority of courts that have considered the issue. Ten of the thirteen
federal circuits have directly considered whether the hybrid-rights ex-
ception exists. 13 6 Of those ten circuits, eight have held that when
lem with the Sixth Circuit's decision to simply throw up its hands in despair:
Smith did not overrule . . . Yoder; it distinguished [it]."), vacated on other
grounds, 220 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2000); Hensley, supra note 37, at 139
("[Ilgnoring hybrid-rights means also ignoring the fact that the Court distin-
guished Yoder.").
131. See supra notes 128, 130 and accompanying text.
132. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 207 (1997) ("[Llower courts should follow the
case which directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its
own decisions.").
133. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233 (1972) ('[Wlhen the interests of
parenthood are combined with a free exercise claim ... more than merely a 'rea-
sonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the State' is required to
sustain the validity of the State's [law] under the First Amendment." (emphasis
added)); see also Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165 (1944) ("The parent's
conflict with the state over control of the child ... is serious enough when only
secular matters are concerned. It becomes the more so when an element of relig-
ious conviction enters." (emphasis added)).
134. See cases cited supra notes 41, 43-44.
135. Hicks, 93 F. Supp. 2d at 661. See also Duncan, Long Live Free Exercise, supra
note 21, at 858 ("[Regardless of the intellectual merits of the hybrid theory, it is
still law until the [Supreme] Court holds otherwise."). At least one prominent
scholar believes "that the notion of 'hybrid' claims was created for the sole pur-
pose of distinguishing Yoder" rather than overruling it in Smith, McConnell,
supra note 4, at 1121, probably because a majority of Justices would not have
voted to overrule Yoder. But even if the hybrid-rights exception truly is nothing
more than a jurisprudential gymnastic created for the sole purpose of allowing
the Smith majority to get around Yoder, that does not diminish the fact that it is
a gymnastic lower courts are compelled to apply in earnest.
136. As of the writing of this Note, the Eleventh and Federal Circuits have not ad-
dressed the issue, nor have any district courts in those circuits. While the Fifth
Circuit itself has yet to consider hybrid rights, several district courts in the Fifth
Circuit have addressed the issue with somewhat mixed results. Compare Ala-
bama & Coushatta Tribes v. Big Sandy Indep. Sch. Dist., 817 F. Supp. 1319, 1332
(E.D. Tex. 1993) (applying strict scrutiny to a school district's requirement that
male students wear short hair to school, because the requirement implicated both
free exercise and parental rights considerations, thereby triggering the Smith hy-
brid-rights exception), with Littlefield v. Forney Indep. Sch. Dist., 108 F. Supp.
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properly invoked, the hybrid-rights exception does result in strict
scrutiny review of the law in question. 13 7 The results are even more
dramatic at the state level, where appellate courts or supreme courts
from fourteen states have addressed the hybrid-rights question. 138 Of
those states, only one explicitly refuses to apply the exception. 139 The
remaining thirteen states all acknowledge the Smith hybrid-rights ex-
ception and hold that when it is triggered, strict scrutiny applies.140
2d 681, 706 (N.D. Tex. 2000) (referring to litigant's combinations of free exercise
and parental rights claims as "bootstrapping" and declining to find a hybrid-
rights exception outside the narrow situation presented by Yoder), affd on other
grounds, 268 F.3d 275 (5th Cir. 2001).
137. See San Jose Christian Coll. v. City of Morgan Hill, 360 F.3d 1024, 1032 (9th Cir.
2004) (holding that the hybrid-rights exception requires strict scrutiny review,
but finding that no hybrid-rights were implicated in the instant case because the
plaintiff had failed to assert a "colorable claim" of violations of free exercise and
one other constitutional right); Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1297
(10th Cir. 2004) (citing the Ninth Circuit's colorable-claim requirement for hy-
brids with approval, and remanding back to trial court for more factual inquires,
so that the validity of plaintiff's hybrid claim could be determined); Civil Liber-
ties for Urban Believers v. City of Chi., 342 F.3d 752, 764-65 (7th Cir. 2003)
(holding that the Smith hybrid-rights exception warrants strict scrutiny but de-
clining to apply the exception in the particular case because the plaintiffs' com-
panion claims were "meritless"); Reich v. Shiloh True Light Church of Christ, No.
95-2765, 1996 WL 228802, at *3 (4th Cir. May 7, 1996) (per curiam) (acknowledg-
ing the hybrid-rights exception from Smith and noting, with approval, the district
court's application of strict scrutiny to the combination of a hybrid free exercise
and parental rights claim); EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455,467 (D.C.
Cir. 1996) (holding that case presented a hybrid-rights situation, mandating
strict scrutiny); Brown v. Hot, Sexy, & Safer Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 539 (1st
Cir. 1995) (acknowledging the existence of the Smith hybrid-rights exception but
finding that child's compulsory attendance at school assembly did not implicate a
parent's substantive due process rights and therefore that the case was not one
where hybrid-rights were implicated); Cornerstone Bible Church v. City of Has-
tings, 948 F.2d 464, 473 (8th Cir. 1991) (citing the district court's dismissal of
plaintiffs hybrid-rights claim with disapproval, and ordering the district court to
consider plaintiffs hybrid-rights claim on remand); Salvation Army v. Dep't of
County Affairs, 919 F.2d 183, 197 (3d Cir. 1990) (acknowledging the existence of
the hybrid-rights exception from Smith but remanding back to trial court for
more proceedings on the question of whether plaintiffs raised a valid freedom of
association claim).
138. This figure excludes Douglas County v. Anaya, 269 Neb. 552, 694 N.W.2d 601,
cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 365 (2005) (mem.), the Nebraska Supreme Court case at
issue in this Note.
139. See Blakely v. Blakely, 83 S.W.3d 537, 548 (Mo. 2002) (citing Kissinger v. Board
of Trustees, 5 F.3d 177 (6th Cir. 1993), with approval and holding that it will not
recognize the Smith hybrid-rights exception because "there is no logical reason to
require strict scrutiny when both religious and parental control issues are consid-
ered together").
140. See Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 102 P.3d 937, 940-44 (Alaska
2004) (acknowledging the Smith hybrid-rights exception, but finding that the
particular facts failed to raise a valid companion claim in addition to free exercise
rights); Roman Catholic Archbishop of L.A. v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. Rptr. 3d
209, 223-24 (Ct. App. 2005) (same); City Chapel Evangelical Free, Inc. v. City of
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The fact that nearly every court to consider the issue has found that
the exception is law on at least some level is strong evidence that the
refusal-to-recognize courts are in error. This fact, and the fact that
the refusal-to-recognize approach to hybrid claims fails to adequately
reconcile Smith and Yoder, both make it clear that it is an inappropri-
ate approach to the hybrid-rights exception.
2. The Independently-Viable-Claim Approach Contradicts
Hybrid-Rights Precedent
Under the independently-viable-claim approach, the hybrid-rights
exception applies only when a party combines a free exercise claim
with a companion claim that, by itself, would result in a finding that
the challenged law is unconstitutional. 14 1 Because parties with inde-
pendently viable companion claims would prevail on the companion
claim alone, this approach renders the hybrid-rights exception super-
South Bend, 744 N.E.2d 443, 454 (Ind. 2002) (citing as error the trial court's de-
nial of a hearing on the merits of the plaintiffs hybrid-rights claim and remand-
ing back to trial court on these grounds); People v. DeJonge, 501 N.W.2d 127,
134-35 (Mich. 1993) (invalidating a state's home school certification requirement
on the grounds that the designation impacted free exercise and parental rights
and failed to withstand the strict scrutiny mandated by the hybrid-rights excep-
tion); Hill-Murray Fed'n of Teachers v. Hill-Murray High Sch., 487 N.W.2d 857,
862-63 (Minn. 1992) (acknowledging that the hybrid-rights exception from Smith
mandates the use of strict scrutiny, but finding that the particular case did not
present a hybrid-rights claim); Valley Christian Sch. v. Montana High Sch. Ass'n,
86 P.3d 554, 559-60 (Mont. 2004) (same); South Jersey Catholic Sch. Teachers
Ass'n v. St. Teresa of the Infant Jesus Church Elementary Sch., 696 A.2d 709,
721-22 (N.J. 1997) (acknowledging the hybrid-rights exception from Smith, but
finding the exception inapplicable to the present case because the challenged reg-
ulation did not implicate parental rights); Health Servs. Div., Health & Env't
Dep't v. Temple Baptist Church, 814 P.2d 130, 135-36 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991) (ac-
knowledging that the Smith hybrid-rights exception mandates strict scrutiny,
but finding that no companion constitutional claim was implicated on the partic-
ular facts); N.Y. Employment Relations Bd. v. Christ the King Reg'l High Sch.,
682 N.E.2d 960,964 (N.Y. 1997) (same); Church at 295 S. 18th St. v. Employment
Dep't, 28 P.3d 1185, 1192-93 (Or. Ct. App. 2001) (same); Scott v. State, 80 S.W.3d
184, 193 (Tex. App. 2002) (holding that without religious exception, testimonial
oath requirement was unconstitutional as it failed to withstand the strict scru-
tiny mandated by the Smith hybrid exception, since the requirement implicated
both free exercise and free speech rights); State v. DeLaBruere, 577 A.2d 254, 261
(Vt. 1990) (holding that state anti-truancy law, which punished parents for send-
ing child to non-certified religious school, triggered strict scrutiny review when it
implicated a hybrid-rights claim of free exercise and parental rights); First Cove-
nant Church of Seattle, 840 P.2d 174, 181-82 (Wash. 1992) (invalidating city's
designation of a church as a landmark on the grounds that the designation impli-
cated the hybrid-rights of the church and failed to withstand the strict scrutiny
that follows when the hybrid-rights exception is triggered).
141. See supra subsection II.A.2.b.
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fluous.142 By eliminating the utility of the hybrid-rights exception,
the independently-viable-claim approach fails to explain the outcome
in Wisconsin v. Yoder. Recall that in Yoder, the Court explicitly noted
that under the parental rights claim alone, the compulsory education
law at issue was constitutional.' 4 3 But despite the fact that the pa-
rental rights claim alone was not independently viable, the Court ap-
plied heightened scrutiny anyway, because the case presented a
unique combination of parental and religious interests. 4 4 Without
the parents' free exercise interests at stake, Yoder would undoubtedly
have been resolved in favor of the state. 145 As stated earlier, above all
else, the legitimacy of an approach to hybrid-rights claims depends
entirely on its consistency with underlying hybrid-rights precedent.14 6
Because the independently-viable-claim approach ignores the signifi-
cance of the mere combination of interests at issue in Yoder, it contra-
142. In Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir. 2004), the Tenth Circuit
stated that
it makes no sense to adopt a strict standard that essentially requires a
successful companion claim because such a test would make the free ex-
ercise claim unnecessary. If the plaintiffs additional constitutional
claim is successful, he or she would typically not need the free exercise
claim and the hybrid-rights exception would add nothing to the case.
Id. at 1297. Similarly, in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hi-
aleah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993), Justice Souter commented in his concurring opinion
that
if a hybrid claim is one in which a litigant would actually obtain an ex-
emption from a formally neutral, generally applicable law, under an-
other constitutional provision, then there would have been no reason for
the Court in what Smith calls hybrid cases to have mentioned the Free
Exercise Clause at all.
Id. at 567 (Souter, J. concurring). See also Hensley, supra note 37, at 131-32
(noting that the cases relying on the "independently viable claim" approach
"demonstrate[ ] the problem of requiring an independent claim to trigger the hy-
brid-rights exception" because in finding that the challenged law violates the
companion claim anyway, "there seems to be no reason for the court to [bring] up
the hybrid-rights doctrine at all").
143. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233 (1972) ("[W]here nothing more than
the general interest of the parent ... is involved, it is beyond dispute that the
State acts 'reasonably' and constitutionally in requiring education to age 16 in
some public or private school meeting the standards prescribed by the State."
(emphasis added)).
144. See id. ("[Wihen the interests of parenthood are combined with a free exercise
claim of the nature revealed by this record, more than merely a 'reasonable rela-
tion to some purpose within the competency of the State' is required." (emphasis
added)).
145. See Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 165 F.3d 692, 704 (9th Cir.
1999) ("[R]epeated references to the Free Exercise Clause in the so-called hybrid
cases [Yoder and Cantwell] leave us with little doubt that, whatever else it did,
the Court did not rest its decisions in those cases upon the recognition of indepen-
dently viable free speech and substantive due process rights."), vacated on other
grounds, 220 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2000).
146. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
20061
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
dicts that case and is therefore an inappropriate method to assess the
applicability of the hybrid-rights exception.
3. The Colorable-Claim Approach also Contradicts Hybrid-
Rights Precedent
Under the colorable-claim approach, the hybrid-rights exception
only applies when the claimant can show that the companion claim
alone has a likelihood of success on the merits. 14 7 By making the ap-
plicability of the hybrid-rights exception depend entirely on the likeli-
hood of success of the companion claim in isolation, the colorable-
claim approach suffers from the same problem as the independently-
viable-claim approach: it directly contradicts Wisconsin v. Yoder.
In Yoder, the Supreme Court unambiguously stated that under the
Amish parent's parental rights claim by itself-which invoked only ra-
tional basis review-the law in question was valid.148 In other words,
independent of any other constitutional interests, the parental rights
claim raised in Yoder was anything but colorable (at least as the Ninth
and Tenth Circuits now define "colorable"). 14 9 Nevertheless, the
Court applied strict scrutiny because it concluded that when "the in-
terests of parenthood are combined with a free exercise claim," the
state had to justify its compulsory education law with something
"more than merely a 'reasonable relation to some purpose within the
competency of the state.'" 150
Because the compulsory education law at issue in Yoder was neu-
tral and generally applicable,15 1 under the Smith Court's characteri-
zation of the Free Exercise Clause, strict scrutiny was not triggered by
the Amish parent's free exercise interests alone.152 Smith acknowl-
edges this by explaining Yoder as a hybrid-rights exception from its
147. See supra text accompanying note 63.
148. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 233 (stating that Wisconsin's compulsory education law is
constitutional under only rational basis review, because "it is beyond dispute that
the state acts 'reasonably'.. . in requiring education to age 16 in some public or
private school meeting the standards prescribed by the State" (emphasis added)).
149. Under the current colorable-claim standard used by the Ninth and Tenth Cir-
cuits, whether the hybrid-rights exception applies depends on the independent
strength of the companion claims alone. See supra text accompanying notes 63,
65-67, 72. But in Yoder, "the parents' right to direct the upbringing of their chil-
dren presumably would not have had any force were it divorced from the free
exercise aspects of the parents' claims." Hicks ex rel. Hicks v. Halifax County Bd.
of Educ., 93 F. Supp. 2d 649, 662 (E.D.N.C. 1999).
150. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 233.
151. See supra note 127.
152. See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882 (1990)
(noting that the Supreme Court's Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence reflects the
principle that "the right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obli-
gation to comply with a 'valid and neutral law of general applicability'" (citing
United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982))).
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general rule.153 But if the companion claim at issue in Yoder was not
colorable, then the Court must have employed something other than
the colorable-claim standard in deciding that the conjunctive interests
at stake warranted strict scrutiny review of a neutral, generally appli-
cable law. Hence, while some proponents of the colorable claim ap-
proach are quick to boast that the approach explains exactly why
Smith itself was not a hybrid-rights case, 1 54 they fail to notice that the
colorable-claim approach cannot explain why Yoder was.
The Ninth and Tenth Circuits use the colorable-claim approach
primarily because they believe that it more effectively limits the num-
ber of exceptions from Smith's general rule than any alternative ap-
proach to hybrid-rights claims.155 While this is a reasonable objective,
153. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 881 ("The only decisions in which we have held that the
First Amendment bars application of a neutral, generally applicable law to relig-
iously motivated action, have involved not the Free Exercise Clause alone, but
the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional protections,
such as . . . the right[s] of parents." (citing Yoder, 406 U.S. at 233)).
154. In Smith, the Supreme Court stated that "[t]he present case does not present
such a hybrid situation, but a free exercise claim unconnected with any communi-
cative activity or parental right." Smith, 494 U.S. at 882 (emphasis added). In
first articulating the colorable-claim approach, the Ninth Circuit took considera-
ble glee in the fact that, while a less stringent approach to hybrid claims might
fail to explain why Smith itself was not deemed a hybrid case, "the colorable
claim standard we adopt engenders no such problem." Thomas v. Anchorage
Equal Rights Comm'n, 165 F.3d 692, 706 (9th Cir. 1999), vacated on other
grounds, 220 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2000). The Ninth Circuit believed that Smith
would not have been a hybrid case under the colorable-claim approach because
under the Supreme Court's free speech jurisprudence, generally applicable laws
that have merely an incidental effect of regulating expressive conduct are only
subject to rational basis review. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560,
576-77 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that, where expressive conduct is
regulated by a neutral law that was not enacted with the purpose to proscribe
expressive conduct specifically for its communicative value, the law in question
need not pass "normal First Amendment scrutiny" (i.e. strict scrutiny), nor even
be "justified by an 'important or substantial' government interest" (i.e. intermedi-
ate scrutiny)). Because Smith's ingestion of peyote was "at best" only "expressive
conduct," Thomas, 165 F.3d at 706, and because the Oregon law banning peyote
consumption was clearly not enacted to proscribe peyote use for its communica-
tive value, see id., a freedom of speech companion claim in Smith would have
invoked only rational basis review. Because rational basis review has a low likeli-
hood of success on the merits, see supra note 18, the Ninth Circuit happily noted
that "[tihe plaintiffs in Smith could not have made out a 'colorable claim of in-
fringement' with respect to their free speech rights." Id.
155. See Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1295 (10th Cir. 2004) (noting with
approval that use of the colorable-claim approach helps prevent an opening of
"the floodgates for hybrid-rights claims" that less stringent approaches would in-
vite); Thomas, 165 F.3d at 705 (holding that "the mere fact that a companion
right is 'implicated' cannot serve as the touchstone for heightened scrutiny" be-
cause "under a permissive 'implication' standard, rarely if ever would a neutral,
generally applicable law be subject to the general rule in Smith" and thus there
would be frequent exceptions from Smith's general rule).
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it should not come at the expense of conformity with hybrid-rights pre-
cedent. As the Ninth Circuit has said itself, "any hybrid rule's ad-
ministrability must play second fiddle to its consistency with Supreme
Court precedent."15 6 Therefore, because the colorable-claim approach
contradicts Yoder, the Supreme Court's quintessential hybrid-rights
case, it too is an inappropriate approach to hybrid-rights claims.
B. Courts Should Use the Genuinely-Implicated Standard
when Evaluating the Applicability of the Hybrid-
Rights Exception
Since the three mainstream lower court approaches to the hybrid-
rights exception are demonstrably flawed, the next question is what
approach courts-including the Nebraska Supreme Court-should
use instead. This section illustrates that only an implication-based
standard, like the genuinely-implicated approach, preserves the hy-
brid-rights exception as a narrow departure from the Smith general
rule in a manner that is consistent with hybrid-rights case law. Ac-
cordingly, it is the superior method to determine whether the hybrid-
rights exception applies to a particular case.
1. The Genuinely-Implicated Approach Best Reflects the Implicit
Logic of the Hybrid-Rights Cases
In contrast to the mainstream lower court approaches, there are
two distinct ways in which the genuinely-implicated approach harmo-
nizes with relevant case law. First, unlike the independently-viable-
claim or colorable-claim approaches, which predicate the hybrid-rights
exception on a calculation of the success of the companion claim alone,
the genuinely-implicated approach reflects the principle that it is
merely the conjunction of free exercise and select companion claim
rights "in and of itself, [that] merits heightened scrutiny."15 7
In Prince v. Massachusetts, the Court noted that parental objec-
tions to state action required heightened judicial scrutiny simply
when "an element of religious conviction enters."158 Similarly, in
Yoder, the Court noted that a law must withstand heightened judicial
scrutiny when "the interests of parenthood are combined with a free
exercise claim."'15 9 Finally, in Smith itself the Court noted that the
exception to the Smith rule is triggered when claims have involved
"the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional pro-
156. Thomas, 165 F.3d at 706 (emphasis added).
157. Hicks ex rel. Hicks v. Halifax County Bd. of Educ., 93 F. Supp. 2d 649, 662
(E.D.N.C. 1999).
158. 321 U.S. 158, 165 (1944) (emphasis added).
159. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233 (1972) (emphasis added).
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tections ... such as... the right of parents."16o Taken together, the
"enters," "combined," and "conjunction" language from Prince, Yoder,
and Smith reflect the idea that "it is the mere presence of the interest,
as a genuine claim.., that triggers the heightened scrutiny of the free
exercise claim."16 1
Because Wisconsin v. Yoder, the charter hybrid-rights case, was
not resolved based on the strength of the companion claim alone,16 2
"whether or not the second constitutional interest is independently vi-
able is not at issue."16 3 Thus, it does not make sense to make the
applicability of the hybrid-rights exception depend on whether the
companion claim has a certitude or even a likelihood of success by it-
self. Rather, the language and logic of Prince, Yoder, and Smith sug-
gest that the hybrid-rights analysis applies when a law merely
implicates a claimant's free exercise right and one of the select com-
panion claim rights.164 Other courts seem to have reached this con-
clusion also, and describe the Smith hybrid-rights exception using
"implication" terms.16 5 It should thus be clear that only an implica-
tion-based standard is consistent with the language, logic, and out-
come in Yoder and Smith.
The second way in which the genuinely-implicated approach re-
mains true to the spirit of underlying hybrid-rights case law is by lim-
iting potential companion claims to only those that the Smith Court
identified as requiring special significance when combined with a re-
ligious interest.16 6 These rights are (i) the freedom of speech and of
160. See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882 (1990)
(emphasis added).
161. Hicks, 93 F. Supp. 2d at 662.
162. See supra subsections III.A.2-3.
163. Hicks, 93 F. Supp. 2d at 662.
164. Id. at 661 (emphasis added).
165. See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 513-14 (1997) (using Yoder as an
example of a hybrid-rights case and noting that the case "implicated not only the
right to the free exercise of religion but also the right of parents to control their
children's education" (emphasis added)); Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v.
City of Chi., 342 F.3d 752, 764 (7th Cir. 2003) ("In Smith, the Supreme Court
noted that, in cases implicating the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with
other constitutional protections, such as freedom of speech and freedom of associ-
ation, the First Amendment may subject ... a neutral, generally applicable law
to a heightened level of scrutiny." (emphasis added)); see also cases cited supra
note 82. Even the Tenth Circuit, in the course of announcing the original colora-
ble-claim standard, could not avoiding using "implication" language to describe
the hybrid-rights exception. See Swanson ex rel. Swanson v. Guthrie Indep. Sch.
Dist. No. I-L, 135 F.3d 694, 699 (10th Cir. 1998) (noting that in Smith, "the Su-
preme Court noted the difference between cases solely involving the Free Exer-
cise Clause and those implicating other constitutional protections, such as the
parental right to direct the education of children" (emphasis added)).
166. See Hicks, 93 F. Supp. 2d at 662 (holding that, under its view, the permissible
companion claims successfully triggering the hybrid-rights exception should be
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the press;16 7 (ii) the right of parents to direct the care, custody, and
control of their children;168 and (iii) the freedom of association.16 9
Other than these three specific rights, the Smith court did not suggest
that any other rights warranted special judicial significance when
combined with religious interests. 170 Therefore, any legitimate ap-
proach to evaluating hybrid-rights claims must also be limited to only
these three companion claims. 17 1 Among the various approaches to
hybrid-rights claims, only the genuinely-implicated standard takes
this into account.
2. The Genuinely-Implicated Approach Preserves the Hybrid-
Rights Exception as a Rare Departure from the Smith
General Rule
In his concurring opinion in Church of the Lukumi Babablu Aye,
Inc. v. City of Hialeah,17 2 a free exercise case before the Supreme
Court three years after Smith, Justice Souter took occasion to criticize
the Smith majority opinion in general and the hybrid-rights exception
in particular. In that opinion, Justice Souter described an implica-
limited to one of the "constitutional interest [s] identified in Smith's hybrid rights
passage").
167. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990) (iden-
tifying one hybrid-worthy companion claim as the assertion of free exercise rights
"in conjunction with other constitutional protections, such as freedom of speech
and of the press," and citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Mur-
dock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943); and Follett v. McCormick, 321 U.S.
573 (1944), as examples of cases where religiously motivated expression was
given heightened judicial deference).
168. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881 (identifying another hybrid-worthy companion claim as
"the right of parents to direct the education of their children" and citing Wiscon-
sin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 510 (1972), as an example).
169. Smith, 494 U.S. at 882 (identifying the last hybrid-worthy companion claim as
the freedom of association by noting that "it is easy to envision a case in which a
challenge on freedom of association grounds would likewise be reinforced by Free
Exercise Clause concerns" (emphasis added) (citing Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468
U.S. 609 (1984))).
170. Nor is the limitation of hybrid-rights to these three interests an arbitrary deter-
mination. The ability to express beliefs, congregate with others, and instill val-
ues in children are all pursuits that take on a critical significance for adherents of
religious faiths. After all, what is religion if not the communal expression of faith
across generations? Therefore, to say that expression, congregation, and chil-
drearing are activities of "Biblical" significance is no understatement.
171. While subsequent case law could theoretically expand on the list of hybrid-wor-
thy companion rights, lower courts should avoid doing so. The Smith Court was
careful to limit the hybrid-rights exception to situations in which Supreme Court
case law had applied unique deference to a right when that right was combined
with religious interests. For example, the special significance afforded to joint
parental rights and free exercise claims has been repeated for roughly sixty
years. See supra subsection II.A.3. Therefore, the Supreme Court should lead
the way in expanding the list of hybrid-worthy companion claims.
172. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
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tion-based approach to applying the hybrid-rights exception as "ulti-
mately untenable." 173 Because an argument can be made that
"[g]overnment action will almost always implicate a host of constitu-
tional rights,"'174 Justice Souter opined that under an implication-
based standard, the hybrid-rights exception would apply in nearly
every case, thereby swallowing the Smith rule.17 5 He concluded his
criticism of an implication-based approach to the hybrid-rights excep-
tion by asking why the exception did not apply in Smith itself, since
"free speech . . . rights are certainly implicated by the peyote
ritual."176
Two responses to Justice Souter's assertions are in order. First,
there are several reasons to dispute Justice Souter's belief that Smith
itself should have been a hybrid-rights case if the Smith majority in-
tended an implication-based approach to hybrid claims. Perhaps the
most obvious reason why Smith itself was not a hybrid-rights case is
simply because it wasn't pled or argued that way.1 7 7 This is an impor-
tant fact that even Justice Souter does not deny.17s
But even if Smith had been litigated on hybrid-rights grounds, the
case still would not have triggered the hybrid-rights exception under
an implication-based approach. Ingesting peyote during a private re-
ligious ceremony does not implicate First Amendment free speech
rights under the test established in Texas v. Johnson,179 a landmark
free speech case in which the Supreme Court considered the constitu-
tionality of laws prohibiting flag burning.
Since burning a flag is not strictly verbal speech, the Johnson
Court had to determine when expressive conduct implicates the First
Amendment. The Court began its analysis by noting that, read liter-
ally, the First Amendment prohibits abridgment of "speech" in the
traditional sense: the written or spoken word.1 8 0 In contrast to verbal
speech, expressive conduct does not automatically implicate the First
173. Id. at 567 (Souter, J., concurring).
174. Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 165 F.3d 692, 705 (9th Cir. 1999),
vacated on other grounds, 220 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2000).
175. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 567 (Souter, J., concurring).
176. Id. See also Thomas, 165 F.3d at 706 ("Under an implication standard, the
claims raised in Smith would themselves have been within the scope of the hy-
brid-rights exception .... ").
177. See Duncan, Long Live Free Exercise, supra note 21, at 859 (noting that the Court
did not address why Smith was not a hybrid case "only because the case was
decided without briefing or argument on this (as yet) undiscovered First Amend-
ment concept").
178. See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 571-72 (Souter, J., concurring) (explaining that "the
Smith rule was not subject to a 'full-dress argument'" because neither party was
prepared for the Court's re-characterization of free exercise jurisprudence and
both parties assumed strict scrutiny applied).
179. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
180. Id. at 404.
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Amendment. The Court held that conduct only "possesses sufficient
communicative elements" to implicate the First Amendment if "[an
intent to convey a particularized message [is] present" and there was
a strong likelihood "that the message would have been understood by
those who viewed it."1s1 Like burning a flag, ingesting peyote during
a Native American ritual is "certainly not 'speech' in the traditional
sense"; at best it is only "expressive conduct."1s 2 Accordingly, peyote
consumption must be accompanied by an intent to convey a particu-
larized message that would have been readily understood by viewers
before it implicates free speech rights. In Johnson, the Court listed
several examples of when such an intent existed.' 8 3 Notably, in each
of the cases the Court cited, the conduct at issue clearly operated as a
(i) public expression (ii) of the actor's dissent from the mainstream
view (iii) on a significant political or social topic.184 These three ele-
ments appear to be the telltale indicia of when the intent to convey a
particularized message is present and will be understood by viewers.
Because the plaintiffs in Smith consumed peyote during a private
religious ceremony18 5 where they were most likely surrounded only by
like-minded believers, their conduct lacks at least two of these three
elements. Therefore, the conduct at issue in Smith can be distin-
guished from the wearing of anti-war armbands in protest of the Viet-
nam War, as in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
District;'8 6 African-Americans sitting in a "whites only" section of a
library to protest segregation, as in Brown v. Louisiana ;187 or burning
an American flag outside a political convention to express displeasure
with a nominee's policies, as in Johnson. As a result, even if the
claimants in Smith had thought to litigate on free exercise and free
speech grounds, they would have been unable to demonstrate that
181. See id. at 405 (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974)).
182. Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 165 F.3d 692, 706 (9th Cir. 1999),
vacated on other grounds, 220 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2000).
183. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 404 (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist.,
393 US. 503 (1969); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966); Schact v. United
States, 398 U.S. 58 (1970); Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v.
Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968); United States v. Grace, 461 U.S.
171 (1983)).
184. See, e.g., Tinker, 393 U.S. at 505 (holding that free speech rights are implicated
by the expressive conduct of students who wore black armbands in protest of
American involvement in the Vietnam conflict); Brown, 383 U.S. at 141-42 (1966)
(holding that free speech rights are implicated by the expressive conduct of Afri-
can-Americans who conducted a "sit-in" in protest of racial segregation). In Texas
v. Johnson itself, Johnson burned a flag during the Republican Party's renomina-
tion of Ronald Reagan for President. The Court held that the "expressive, overtly
political nature of this conduct was both intentional and overwhelmingly appar-
ent." Johnson, 491 U.S. at 406.
185. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 874 (1990).
186. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
187. 383 U.S. 131 (1966).
[Vol. 85:311
MAKING SENSE OF HYBRID RIGHTS
they ingested peyote with an intent to convey a particularized mes-
sage of the unpopular, public, and politicized nature necessary for ex-
pressive conduct to implicate First Amendment free speech rights.
The result may well have been different if, for example, the plain-
tiffs in Smith had been arrested for ingesting peyote on the steps of
Oregon's capitol building during a protest against the legislature's ban
on the drug. Had that been the case, such conduct may have impli-
cated free speech rights. But under the facts of the actual case,
viewed in light of the Court's free speech jurisprudence, the Smith ma-
jority was right to conclude that the case "does not present such a hy-
brid situation, but a free exercise claim unconnected with any
communicative activity."188 Therefore, under an implication-based
approach, Smith was resolved exactly as it should have been.
Justice Souter's second argument-that an implication-based ap-
proach to hybrid-rights claims would force courts to apply the excep-
tion in nearly every free-exercise case-is similarly flawed. In fact,
the genuinely-implicated approach limits the frequency of exceptions
from the Smith general rule in two distinct ways. First, by restricting
the hybrid-rights exception to only those cases in which the compan-
ion claim asserted is one of the three companion claims specifically
mentioned in Smith's hybrid-rights passage,1S9 the first prong of the
genuinely-implicated standard calls for courts to reject claims where
the companion right asserted is not one of the three unique claims
cited as significant in SmithlO or is simply an imaginary right.191
Ironically, even courts adopting more stringent approaches to hybrid-
rights claims in hopes of reducing the number of exceptions from
Smith's general rule192 never bothered to consider that perhaps the
exception should be limited to the three unique companion rights
listed in Smith and not opened up to any possible companion right.
Second, the genuinely-implicated approach limits the hybrid-rights
exception by allowing courts to reject hybrid claims when the plaintiff
fails to provide evidence that the challenged law or official conduct
adversely impacts, and therefore genuinely implicates, the asserted
companion right. Accordingly, courts using this standard would easily
reject frivolous attempts to invoke the hybrid-rights exception in cases
188. Smith, 494 U.S. at 882 (emphasis added).
189. See supra text accompanying notes 167-69.
190. See, e.g., Green v. City of Phil., No. Civ.A. 03-1476, 2004 WL 1170531, at *7 (re-
jecting a hybrid-rights assertion that relied on the Second Amendment right to
bear arms as the companion claim).
191. See, e.g., Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d 1202, 1208 (9th Cir. 1999) (rejecting a hybrid-
rights assertion that relied on the 'non-existent claim of a 'right to drive'" as the
companion claim).
192. See supra note 155.
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where the facts make clear that the asserted companion claim is not
genuinely implicated by the law or official conduct in question.1 93
In sum, the genuinely-implicated approach is just as effective as
the alternative approaches in ensuring that only legitimate compan-
ion claims trigger the hybrid-rights exception.i 94 However, unlike the
colorable-claim approach, the genuinely-implicated approach limits
the applicability of the hybrid-rights exception in a manner that more
accurately reflects the logic inherent in the Supreme Court's hybrid-
rights jurisprudence. Accordingly, the genuinely-implicated approach
is the superior method for evaluating assertions of hybrid-rights.
C. The Anayas Raised a Valid Hybrid-Rights Claim Under
the Genuinely-Implicated Approach
Having demonstrated that the genuinely-implicated approach is
the superior standard to evaluate the applicability of the hybrid-rights
exception, the only remaining question is whether the Anayas would
have triggered the hybrid-rights exception had the Nebraska Supreme
Court used the genuinely-implicated approach in Douglas County v.
Anaya. Under the first prong of the genuinely-implicated approach, a
party must assert a violation of one of the three unique companion
claims identified in the Smith hybrid-rights passage19 5 in addition to
a free exercise claim. The Anayas have satisfied the first prong of the
genuinely-implicated approach by objecting to Nebraska's metabolic
testing law on the grounds that the law violates their Fourteenth
Amendment substantive due process right to parental autonomy in
childrearing. 196
193. See, e.g., Grace United Methodist Church v. City of Cheyenne, 427 F.3d 775, 790
(10th Cir. 2005) (holding that the hybrid-rights exception was not applicable be-
cause the church's free speech rights were not implicated, since the land use laws
at issue "were unrelated to expression," and there was no evidence that "the zon-
ing regulations affected the ability of the Church members to speak, assemble, or
associate with one another"); San Jose Christian Coll. v. City of Morgan Hill, 360
F.3d 1024, 1032 (9th Cir. 2004) (rejecting a Christian college's assertion of hy-
brid-rights, in part, on the grounds that the city's zoning law at issue did not
implicate the college's freedom of speech rights, because the argument that the
prohibited building itself is a form of speech, is meritless); Swanson ex rel. Swan-
son v. Guthrie Indep. Sch. Dist., 135 F.3d 694, 699-700 (10th Cir. 1998) (declin-
ing to apply hybrid-rights exception to parents' religiously motivated objection to
district's home schooling policy, on the grounds that the right to "pick and choose"
which classes their child attends does not implicate parents' Fourteenth Amend-
ment substantive due process rights to direct their child's education).
194. Note that in the cases cited supra notes 190-91 and 193, the presiding courts all
purported to use the colorable-claim approach. Yet the genuinely-implicated ap-
proach would have rejected these frivolous claims just as efficiently as the courts
actually hearing those cases did.
195. See supra text accompnaying notes 167-69.
196. See Douglas County v. Anaya, 269 Neb. 552, 554, 694 N.W.2d 601, 604, cert. de-
nied, 126 S. Ct. 365 (2005) (mem.). An argument could have been raised as to
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The second prong requires a party to demonstrate that Nebraska's
metabolic testing law genuinely implicates their parental rights. As a
threshold matter, the Anayas' sincerity in their belief that a loss of
blood will reduce the lifespan of their child was never called into ques-
tion. 197 Undoubtedly, the State's attempts to subject the Anayas'
child to metabolic testing against their wishes implicates the Anayas'
constitutionally protected liberty interest in their child. The letters
sent by state officials and court orders commanding the Anayas to im-
mediately comply with Nebraska's metabolic testing law 98 are evi-
dence that the Anayas' parental rights have been implicated.
Accordingly, the Anayas have satisfied both prongs of the genuinely-
implicated approach and would have successfully invoked the Smith
hybrid-rights exception had the Nebraska Supreme Court used this
approach to hybrid-rights claims. As a result, their joint free exercise
and parental rights claim warranted strict scrutiny review of Ne-
braska's metabolic testing law.199
IV. CONCLUSION
The Nebraska Supreme Court erred in applying the Smith hybrid-
rights exception when it failed to use the genuinely-implicated ap-
proach in Douglas County v. Anaya. In contrast to the alternatives,
the genuinely-implicated approach not only preserves the hybrid-
rights doctrine as a narrow exception, but also stays true to the logic
and result in the Prince, Yoder, and Smith trio of landmark hybrid-
whether a parent's objection to state compulsory medical procedures is within the
scope of a parent's Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest in his or her children.
See Boone v. Boozman, 217 F. Supp. 2d 938, 955 (E.D. Ark. 2002) (noting that
'the key characteristic of [the prior Supreme Court hybrid-rights] cases is that
they relate to educational instruction" and thus a parent's challenge to a vaccina-
tion law falls outside the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment, precluding consid-
eration of such a case as a hybrid claim). While that argument has its flaws, it is
not necessary to address them here because, as noted earlier, the Nebraska Su-
preme Court never denied that the Anayas' parental rights claim fell within the
scope of parents' Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process interests in
their children. See supra text accompanying note 118. Accordingly, the point is
moot as far as both the Anayas' case and this Note are concerned.
197. Douglas County v. Anaya, No. 1030, slip op. at 1-2 (Douglas County Dist. Ct. Dec.
19, 2003).
198. See supra text accompanying notes 103-05, 108, 113.
199. Intentionally absent from this Note's analysis is a discussion of whether the
Anayas would have prevailed had the Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the
metabolic testing law with strict scrutiny. I deliberately omit such a discussion
because it is irrelevant. Whether or not the use of strict scrutiny would have
made a difference in Anaya, the point of this Note is to illustrate that Anaya has
established erroneous precedent that is at odds with the Supreme Court's case
law in this area. By drawing attention to the Nebraska Supreme Court's analysis
in Anaya, my intent is to affect hybrid-rights litigation on the whole, not just the
particular hybrid-rights case at issue here.
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rights cases. Had the Nebraska Supreme Court used this approach to
hybrid-rights claims, it would have concluded that Nebraska's meta-
bolic testing law genuinely implicates both the Anayas' Free Exercise
Clause rights and Fourteenth Amendment rights as parents. Accord-
ingly, the court would have reviewed Nebraska's metabolic testing law
with strict scrutiny.
In failing to use the appropriate approach to evaluate the applica-
bility of the hybrid-rights exception, Anaya is a stalwart rejection of
the heightened judicial respect traditionally afforded to joint free exer-
cise and parental rights claims. Prince, Yoder, and Smith would force
the state to show a compelling interest to justify simultaneous in-
fringements on parental rights and free exercise interests. But under
Anaya, the state need only show a reasonable relation to a "legiti-
mate" legislative interest, even when a law implicates a claimant's
free exercise and parental rights. Whereas Prince, Yoder, and Smith
demand that governments exercise the utmost caution in imposing a
burden on parents' autonomy in raising children according to their re-
ligious beliefs, Anaya allows the State to use all but the most extreme
degree of capriciousness in doing so.
Unfortunately, other courts are likely to repeat the Nebraska Su-
preme Court's mistake and similarly deny heightened judicial respect
to historically significant constitutional interests. As illustrated by
the divergent conclusions of the federal courts of appeals,20 0 and the
ambiguous nature of the Anaya opinion itself,20 1 the hybrid-rights ex-
ception is a confusing mess of contradictory interpretations and vague
holdings. Consequently, it is easy for courts to misapply. Until lower
courts return to the charter hybrid-rights cases and thereby recognize
that the hybrid-rights exception does exist and that only an implica-
tion-based approach is valid, legitimate hybrid-rights claims will be
consistently denied in the years to come.
Ultimately, only the Supreme Court can definitively resolve the
questions of whether the hybrid-rights exception exists, and if so,
when it applies. Unfortunately, it has been over a decade since the
Supreme Court even mentioned the hybrid-rights exception, 20 2 and
the Court has shown an unwillingness to review hybrid-rights
cases. 203 Thus, it may be a long time-if ever-before concrete an-
200. See supra subsections II.A.2.a-d.
201. See supra note 121.
202. As of the writing of this Note, it has been sixteen years since the hybrid-rights
exception was announced in Employment Division, Department of Human Re-
sources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). Other than a brief reference in a subse-
quent Supreme Court free exercise case, see City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S.
507, 513-14 (1997), the Court has not mentioned the hybrid-rights exception.
203. After losing at the Nebraska Supreme Court, the Anayas appealed to the United
States Supreme Court. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Anaya v. Douglas
County, 126 S. Ct. 365 (2005) (No. 04-1718), 2005 WL 1467344. Unfortunately,
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swers are forthcoming. Until then, courts must make the most of
what they have available by dutifully applying the exception in light
of both Smith and the underlying hybrid-rights precedent.
Benjamin I. Siminou
only three justices voted to grant certiorari at the initial certiorari conference,
and the appeal died when the possible fourth vote, the newly confirmed Chief
Justice John Roberts, declined to participate in the certiorari decision. See Anaya
v. Douglas County, 126 S. Ct. 365 (mem.), denying cert. to 269 Neb. 552, 694
N.W.2d 601 (2005).
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